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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND S. KING,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case

HOWARD FIRM and PAUL J. COX,

No~

8201

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondents will be referred to herein as defendants,
and Appellant will be referred to as plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brought this action to recover the sum of
$31,920.40, his costs, and such other and further relief
as to the court may seem just and equitable in the premises
for the alleged wrongful and unlawful dispossession or
ouster of the plain tiff from certain premises leased by
defendants to plaintiff, under the terms and conditions of
a written instrument designated "Lease" and identified
as Exhibit ''A.''
The premises involved are described in the lease as
follows:
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Description of Property
A part of Lot 16 of 0. D. Gifford's survey of
the East half of the Northwest quarter and the
North half of the Southwest quarter of Section 28
Township 41 South Range 10 West Salt Lake
Meridian, located on property of the Lessors on
the West side of the Utah State Highway #15
and consisting of the refreshment building 20 ft. x
20 ft. in size and opposite the Zionville Cafe and
Motel with 100 feet of ground fronting on said
road and extending back of West side about 50 feet
to a semicircular terrace; the said premises being
located about one. .third mile from the South en . .
trance to Zion National Park.
The term of the lease was from May 1st, 1951 to
May 1st, 1957.
The purpose of the lease as ·set forth therein was
to permit the plaintiff "to conduct a refreshment business
furnishing sandwiches, hot dogs, soft drinks, beer, candy,
cigarettes and novel ties.''
Without objection from the defendants, plaintiff
testified that the operation of a soft ice cream machine
was contemplated by the parties (Rec. 110. . 112). See
Defendants' testimony on this point (Rec. 161 . . 162). Even
this evidence does not support any specific agreement be. .
tween the parties that the defendants were to supply ade . .
quate water for the operation of a soft ice cream machine.
The water supply was sufficient to operate a refreshment
business such as delineated in the lease agreement.
As shown by the record much of plaintiff's claim
for damages evolves about his contention that the failure
of the defendants to furnish adequate water supply for
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his soft ice cream machine caused great loss of business
(Record 93 . . 101), yet he admitted on cross examination
that his experience with the operation of the soft ice
cream machine at the cafe before the construction of the
so . .called Frosty Freeze Building proved definitely there was
not sufficient water supply in the whole Spring Dale area
to keep even one unit of such equipment in constant opera. .
tion and at full capacity (Record 109. . 114). Defendants
attempted to supply an auxiliary source of water through
a well but this had to be abandoned when the water level
in the river became too low. Plaintiff then installed an
air cooler for the remainder of the 1952 season.
While plaintiff claimed damage through the loss of
business allegedly attributed to failure of the defendants
to have the building completed yet on the trial of the
case he admitted that loss of business through this con . .
clition \Vas practically nill ( Record 121).
\Xlith respect to the modification of the lease to pro . .
vide for the first year of operation rental at 5% of the
net instead of 5 7o of the gross take the facts are Defendant
Firm at all times relied on the terms of the lease for the
meaning of the expression "first year" (Rec. 163 . . 164).
The Lease "Exhibit 5" 5th paragraph reads:
"The said lessee covenants and agrees to pay
to said lessor as rental for said premises· at the rate
of $50.00 per month during the summer months
of May to October of each year, payable monthly
in advance but such period to be limited to the
months in which profitable business can be con . .
ducted also to be extended to other months in
case profitable business can be conducted or in
lieu of said above rental, the lessee may pay to
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the lessors 5 % of the gross sales of said business
and he shall keep a strict account thereof and
make payment on the first day of each month
during the periods as above stated."
That the expression "first year of operation" as used
by the parties in their modification agreement could mean
only the seasonal operation in the year 1951 finds ample
support in plaintiff's statement of facts (Page 4 of brief,
1st paragraph).
No accounting of sales or profits was made by plaintiff
and no tender of any rent whatsoever until almost a month
after defendants served plaintiff with written notice of
termination of the lease Ex. 7. This notice was served
on July 26th, 1952, and on August 29th, 1952, plaintiff
presented an accounting to the defendants Plaintiff's Ex. .
hibit "8," and tendered a check in the sum of $100.00.
Firm refused to accept the accounting or the check and on
August 23rd, 1953, placed a padlock on the door of the
Frosty Freeze Building.
No demand was ever made by plaintiff for surrender
of possession of the premises or of the contents. About all
that happened in that regard is reflected in the cross ex-amination of Mrs. Hirschi, plaintiff's witness when she and
plaintiff went to Mr. Firm and asked to be let in the build-ing to see some papers and some of his supplies (Record
17. . 18).
In a transaction between plaintiff and the defendants
entirely independent of the lease involved in this action,
plaintiff loaned money t9 the defendants, and took as
security a mortgage on properties other than the Frosty
Freeze Building. This mortgage was dated September 1,
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1951, and called for $1800.00 principal. In the spring
of March 1, 1952, nothing had been paid on this mort,
gage and the parties then agreed upon a new note and
mortgage for $2146.00. The difference of $346.00 repre-sented the cost of some equipment installed by plain-tiff and was intended to secure a promissory note of
even date in the amount of $2146.00. Between the time
of the execution of the original $1800.00 mortgage and
the spring of 1952 defendant Firm became married. The
new papers were drafted to include the signature of Firm's
wife. Plaintiff's coun·sel advised her signature was not
necessary because the original transaction took place before
Firm's marriage, but said in substance it would do no harm
to have Mrs. Firm sign the note and mortgage and it might
help (Record 128). Mrs. Firm refused to sign, but Mr.
and Mrs. Paul J. Cox and Mr. Howard Firm, all parties
to the original deal, signed and plaintiff took possession
of the documents and retained same to the day of the
trial, and at that time made no attempt to deliver same
to the defendants or either of them or to declare they were
of no value or use to him. On the contrary plaintiff testi-fied he was still holding the chattel mortgage for $2146.00
to secure the payment of the $346.00 (Rec. 133).
The court found the new note and mortgage for
$2146.00 were valid and subsisting obligations of the de-fendants, except for the payments made thereon and that
defendants still owed plaintiff $346.00 thereon, but not
due and payable until March of 1954. Plaintiff contends
payment of $1967.50 was credited on the old mortgage
and that the $346.00 embraced in the new documents,
making a principal obligation of $2146.00 instead of
$1800.00 then became an open account, although he still
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held the note and mortgage for $2146.00 as security for
the 346.00 (Rec. 133).

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT 1
DEFENDANTS RIGHTFULLY TERMINATED
PLAINTIFF'S LEASE AND TOOK POSSESSION OF
THE PREMISES FOR PLAINTIFF'S FAlLURE TO
RENDER THE ACCOUNTINGS AND PAY THE
RENTALS PROVIDED BY THE LEASE AGREE..
MENT.
ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANTS RIGHTFULLY TERMIN..
A TED PLAINTIFF'S LEASE AND TOOK POSSES..
SION OF THE PREMISES FOR PLAINTIFF'S
FAILURE TO RENDER THE ACCOUNTINGS AND
PAY THE RENTALS PROVIDED BY THE LEASE
AGREEMENT.
At the outset it is clear from plaintiff's pleadings,
his position taken at the pre..trial, his statement to the
Trial Judge at the commencement of the trial (pages One
and Two of the Record), his conduct throughout the
trial, and his position taken in his brief before this Hon..
arable Court, that the action is brought under the Forcible
Entry and Unlawful Detainer Statute, although no founda..
tion was laid for such action and no deman·d for restitu..
tion of the premises was made in the pleadings or sought
at the trial. The Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Statute of Utah is essentially and primarily a remedy pro..
vided for restitution of premises forcibly entered and/or
forcibly or unlawfully detained. Forcible entry and de ..
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tainer as a civil proceeding is based on, and has by modern
legislation been evolved from the English forcible entry
and detainer which was a criminal proceeding merely.
The remedy is purely statutory and is summary in char~
acter. The action is strictly possessory in its nature, so
that ordinarily the immediate right to be reinstated in
possession of the realty is all that is involved and can be
determined. It is a remedy for the protection of possession
of realty, whether rightful or wrongful, against forcible in~
vasion, its objects being to prevent disturbances of the
public peace, and to forbid any person righting himself by
his own hand and by violence.
The Utah statute clearly authorizes recovery of dam~
ages in a forcible entry and detainer action. The damages
must be such as are the natural and proximate con~
sequences of the acts complained of. The remedy for dam~
ages is purely incidental . to the primary or summary
remedy provided for restitution of the realty, and the
statute makes no provision for recovery of damages by
separate action for trespass, as is provided under the
statutes of some of our states, such as Michigan (Lane
vs. Ruhl, 61 N.W. 347, 103 Mich. 38).
Under these circumstances the Trial Judge, Hon. Will
J. Hoyt, took the position, and tried the case, upon the
theory that plaintiff's suit was not, and could not be, pre~
dicated or bottomed on the forcible entry and detainer
statute under the pleadings presented, but rather was an
action for damages for alleged breach of defendants' agree~
ment to construct a refreshment building and furnish
adequate water supply to operate the business contem~
plated by plaintiff's lease.
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Defendants alleged and proved substantial perform~
ance of their covenants under the lease; alleged and proved
failure of the plaintiff to render accounting of his conduct
of the business and payment of the rentals provided by
the lease agreement.
We therefore take the position before this honorable
court that the trial judge took the right theory of this
proceeding at the outset, and that the findings, conclusions,
and judgment are amply supported by the evidence.
To justify our position that we rightfully terminated
plaintiff's lease and took possession of the premises we
shall attempt to respond seriatim to the points presented
by plaintiff in support of his assertion that defendants
wrongfully and unlawfully dispossessed plaintiff and term~
inated his lease.

( 1) THAT DURING THE YEAR 1952, DE..
PENDANTS DID NOT FURNISH SUFFICIENT
WATER TO PLAINTIFF FOR OPERATION OF THE
SOFT ICE CREAM MACHINES.
a. Operation of soft ice cream machines was not
specifically specified in the lease agreement.
b. Assuming the parties dehors the lease provisions
had in contemplation operation of soft ice cream machines,
plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact that the only water
supply for the entire area was insufficient to operate even
one unit of such a machine at full capacity constantly,
and that if defendants' by their efforts to supply additional
water from a well failed they had done all that was
physically possible to perform their covenant to supply
adequate water. Plaintiff was not misled by this provision
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of the lease and when the water supply from the well
failed he installed an air cooler. This substitute he must
have had in mind when he undertook the soft ice cream
business, after his experience at the cafe.
c. Alleged damage from this source was too specu. .
lative and no substantial evidence was presented upon
which a judgment could lie.
(2) THAT DURING THE YEAR 1951 AND UN. .
TIL JUNE 16, 1952, DEFENDANTS WERE INDEBTED
TO PLAINTIFF IN THE SUM OF $1,942.50.
a. This statement is correct, but the indebtedness was
founded upon an independent transaction between the
parties; the indebtedness was secured by a chattel mort. .
gage and in no sense could have been a proper off. .set to
plaintiff's obligation for rent under the lease.
(3) THAT FROM JUNE 16th UNTIL APRIL 23,
1952, DEFENDANTS WERE INDEBTED TO PLAIN. .
TIFF IN THE SUM OF $346.00 ON OPEN ACCOUNT.
a. There is absolutely no evidence to support this
statement. Plaintiff at all times after the execution of the
note and mortgage of March 1st, 1952, for $2146.00
took the position that this $346.00 was secured by the
mortgage (Record 133).
b. The indebtedness was not due and payable until
March 1st, 1954, hence could not be used as an off. .set to
plaintiff's obligation to the defendants for rent.
( 4) THAT DEFENDANTS TOOK OVER FORC. .
IBLY FROM PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEES POSSESSION
OF THE FROSTY FREEZE PLACE OF BUSINESS ON
THE 23rd DAY OF AUGUST, 1952.
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a. No force was applied in taking possession of the
premises. Defendant Firm simply told plaintiff's employee,
Mrs. Hirschi, he would have to padlock the door, which
he proceeded to do.
b. Written notice of their intention to terminate the
lease and take possession of the premises had previously
been personally served on plaintiff, under date of July
26th, 1952, alleging or stating the cause to be the failure
of the plaintiff to make accountings and pay rent as pro. .
vided in the lease. Plaintiff's offer of August 19th, 1952,
was not a compliance with his agreement and was properly
refused by defendant Firm.
(5) THAT THEREAFTER, DEFENDANTS HAVE
BEEN IN SOLE, EXCLUSIVE AND CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE FROSTY FREEZE PREMISES
AND ALL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES THEREIN.
a. This statement is correct. Possession has been
rightful at all times indicated.
( 6) THAT ON OCTOBER 6, 1952, DEFEN. .
DANTS REFUSED PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO RE. .
ENTER AND REMOVE PERSONAL PROPERTY
FROM THE FROSTY FREEZE PREMISES.
a. No demand or request was made by plaintiff on
Oct. 6, 1952, to remove any property from the Frosty
Freeze premises. Plaintiff asked permission to enter to
look at some supplies and papers. This was refused by
defendant Firm, unless it was all right with Mr. Cox.
It is not clear from the record whether Firm referred to
his partner Paul Cox or his then attorney LeRoy H.
Cox.
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b. Plaintiff made no offer to pay the rental obliga. .
tion at that time.
(7) THAT THE FROSTY FREEZE BUILDING
HAS NEVER BEEN COMPLETED AS CONTEM..
PLATED BY THE PARTIES.
a. No substantial evidence was ever presented as to
just what a completed building for Frosty Freeze business
meant in the contemplation of the parties.
b. The plaintiff waived any deficiency in this respect
for the first season of 1951 when he got his rental reduced
to 5 ?~ of net take.
c. For the year 1952, additional work was done on
the building and plaintiff himself admitted little, if any,
damage resulted from anything yet to be done to complete
the building (Record 121 ) .
(8) THAT THE FAILURE TO FURNISH SUFFI ..
CIENT WATER FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
FROSTY FREEZE BUSINESS AND THE FAILURE TO
COMPLETE THE FROSTY FREEZE BUILDING HAVE
CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
a. These contentions we feel are amply answered by
answers to Nos. 1 and 7 above.
(9) THAT THE WIFE OF DEFENDANT FIRM,
REFUSED TO SIGN THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE
AND PROMISSORY NOTE AND THAT NONE OF
THE PARTIES CONSIDERED THE CHATTEL MORT..
GAGE AND NOTE FOR $2146.00 AS A VALID IN..
STRUMENT.
a. The note and chattel mortgage for $2146.00 was a
renewal of a previous obligation duly executed by all
parties who signed the original note and mortgage for
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$1800.00. This was an obligation incurred by Firm prior
to his marriage to the present Mrs. Firm who refused to
sign the new note and mortgage. It was in no sense an
obligation of Mrs. Firm. The plaintiff and his counsel both
deemed her signature unnecessary, but added provision
for it with the thought it would do not harm and might
do some good (Rec. 128).
b. The testimony of defendant Paul J. Cox regarding
the validity of the note and mortgage of March I, 1952,
for $2146.00 was not directed to the matter of Mrs. Firm
failing to sign the instruments, but to the fact that he
later learned there was some controversy over the liability
of the defendants for certain items installed at the Frosty
Freeze building and which were included in the items of
cost making up the bill for 346.00 which was added to
the original obligation of $1800.00.
c. Plaintiff retained possession of the note and mort. .
gage in question and testified at the trial that he still re. .
garded the instruments as security for payment of the
$346.00 (Rec. 133).
It is therefore clear from the evidence that there was
no failure on the part of the defendants or either of them
to comply with the terms of their agreement with plaintiff
which justified plaintiff in failing to make monthly, ac. .
curate accounting of his conduct of the business and pay
the rentals specifically agreed upon in the lease agree. .
ment.
If the defendants had regarded the lease agreement
as tied into the previous indebtedness payable by them to
plaintiff they might well have made claim to an off. .set for
the rental due them. Instead, they fully paid the principal
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and interest of their obligation and permitted plaintiff
to retain possession of the new note and mortgage which
included the $346.00 ·additional. The court found this a
valid subsisting obligation from the defendants to plaintiff,
but not due and payable until March 1, 1954, hence
not a set. .off against plaintiff's rent obligation to de. .
fendants.
Plaintiff cites the following cases in support of his
contention that since Mrs. Howard Firm refused to sign
the note and mortgage of March 1, 1952, for the prin . .
cipal sum of $2146.00 none of the other parties who
had already signed were bound by their signatures and
the instruments were therefore null and void:
Ely vs. Phillips, 89 W. Va. 580, 109 S. E. 808.
Stockyards Nat'l Bank of South Omaha v.
Bragg 67 Ut. 60, 245 Pac. 966, and Martineau vs.
Hanson, 47 Ut. 549, 155 Pac. 432, and other cases
cited in the Stockyards case.
Anthony Macaroni Co. vs. Nunziato, 5 Cal.
App. 2nd 588, 43 Pac. 2nd 315.
We have carefully examined all of these cases but
find none of them applicable to the facts in the instant
case. We find no quarrel with the principle laid down
in these authorities, but in each case the facts squarely
support the principle. In the case at bar the obligation
was but a renewal of an old obligation and was uJlhesi . .
tatingly executed by all the original signers, none of whom
even tacitly indicated they would not be bound by their
signatures unless Mrs. Firm would also sign. The fact
that the holder did not record the mortgage does not make
the obligation invalid. As between the parties then1selves

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
the instrument is valid and subsisting and the Court so
found.
In the Anthony Macaroni Co. vs. Nunxiato case cited
by plaintiff a lease agreement was involved in which two
partners, Raulli and Bizzari, were to execute said lease as
Lessors and Nunziato as Lessee. Raulli signed, but Bizzari
refused. Nunziato agreed to take this lease in lieu of the
assignment of prior lease on the same premises, provided
both Raulli and Bizzari signed the second lease. Upon his
refusal to sign the court held the lease invalid. This case
is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
In passing on the Macaroni case the court cited with
approval Cavanaugh vs. Cassellman, 83 Cal. 543, 26 Pac.
515, where the court held:
It is not the rule that a contract which upon
its ·face purports tobe inter partes must invariably
be executed by all whose names appear in the
instrument before it should be binding upon any.
One reason why it is held in so many cases that
an agreement is not to be operative upon one until
it has been signed by another, is that such sign. .
ing is the consideration upon which such other
first signer is to be bound, but when a sufficient
consideration for the agreement on the part of the
first signer is shown to authorize its enforcement,
he cannot be released therefrom unless he can show
there were other considerations for his signing the
instrument than those named in the instrument.
In Bishop Contracts, 348, it is said:
"If by parol stipulation, or a fortiori, if by the
writing itself, the contract was not to be deemed
complete until other signatures should be added,
it without such addition will not bind those who
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have signed it, but if nothing of this appears, the
parties signing will be holden, even though on the
face of it the signatures of others were contemplated
by the draftsman. The same rule is stated in Kurtz
vs. Forquer, 94 Cal. 91, 29 Pac. 413.
And again: In C.J.S. Vol. 59, Page 165, Sec.
119, It is said: "A mortgage intended to be exe..cuted by joint mortgagors is not binding on any
who fail to sign and acknowledge it, but it may,
if the circumstances permit be held valid against
those who do execute it. Citing C.J. Vol. 41, Page
419, Sec. 273, supporting text with the following
authorities:
Taylor vs. Riddle, (Tenn. Ch.) 57 SW 158.
East Texas Fire Ins. Co. vs. Clarke 79 Tex. 23,
15 sw 166.
Davis vs. Hall (Ark.) 179 SW 323.
11 L.R.A. 293.
See also:
Peacock vs. Horne, 126 S.E. 813, 159 Ga. 707.
Rubendall vs. Tarbox, 208 Ill. App. 3 76.
Utilities Ins. Co. vs. Stuart, a Nebraska case,
278 N.W. 827.
Winter vs. Kitto, 100 Cal. App. 302, 279
Pac. 1024.
We submit the great weight of authority will support
the court's finding that Howard Firm, Paul J. Cox, and
Mrs. Paul J. Cox are bound by the Note and mortgage
executed by them on March 1st, 1952, although Mrs.
Howard Firm failed to join in said instruments. Their
indebtedness not yet due and payable under that obliga. .
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tion can not be used as an off. .set by plaintiff under his
rental obligation to the defendants.
Plaintiff having failed to predicate his case on the
forcible entry and detainer statute, we are unable to see
how the case of Paxton vs. Fisher, 86 Utah, 408, 45 P.
2nd 903, applies.
The alleged eviction of plaintiff by defendants must
be proved on grounds wholly distinct from the principles
laid down in the Paxton case.
Plaintiff cites the case of Hargrave vs. Leigh, 73 Utah,
178, 283 Pac. 298, in support of his alleged eviction by
defendants. .After carefully examining and considering
that case, we believe that case is clearly distinguishable
from the case at bar. In that case the tenant was a month
to month. ten~t. She owed some rent, but no notice to
quit was served upon her as provided by the statute, for
that cause or any other.
Plaintiff also cites Richardson vs. Pridmore, 97 Cal.
App; 2nd, 124, 217 Pac. 2nd 113, 17 A.L.R. 2nd, 1929.
That case is also clearly distinguishable from the case at
bar. In that case the tenant's rent was fully paid for the
period involved. During his absence the landlord removed
all the tenant's belongings to the basement, changed the
lock on. the door, and refused to admit tenant to the apart..ment upon his return. Tenant's wife was in an early stage
of pregnancy and by reason of the landlord refusing to
let her use the freight elevator to take her belongings
out of the building, together with other abus}ve conduct,
a miscarriage resulted. The court rightfully held the ten..ant was wrongfully evicted and that her miscarriage was
the direct or proximate result of the mistreatment she
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
received on the occasion of her eviction. We fail to see
how plaintiff can take any comfort from this authority.
CONCLUSION
Even if this court should determine the $346.00 due
and owing by defendants to plaintiff on open account
rather than in the chattel mortgage, we contend lessee may
not rely on a set off or counterclaim to excuse his failure to
pay the rent so as to prevent a forfeiture, except in a case
where the lessor has expressly or impliedly agreed thereto:
Taylor vs. Brice, 34 N. E. 833, 7 Ind. App. 551; Morrill
vs. De Ia Granja, 99 Mass. 383; Johnson vs. Douglas, 73
Mo. 168.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, when the
lease contains a provision the lessor may proceed to end the
lease on the breach of a covenant to pay rent: American
Surety Co. of New York vs. U. S. C.C.A., 112 Fed. 2nd
903; Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. vs.
Moore, 64 Pac. 2d 460, 18 Cal. App. 2d 522; Kulawitz
vs. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 155 Pac. 2d 24, 25
Cal. 2d 664; Weill vs. Centralia Service & Oil Co., 51 N. E.
2d 345, 320 Ill. App. 397.
The defendants rightfully terminated plaintiff's lease
and took possession of the leased premises for his failure
to pay the rentals provided in the agreement.
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment in this case are
amply supported by the evidence and should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,
Counsel /or Respondents.
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